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buzzwords  
 
The possibilities for ‘developmental states’ in Africa has become a subject of interest, if a 
speculative one, for scholars, development practitioners and African leaders alike. This 
article gives an overview of debates concerning the usefulness of the ‘east Asian model’ 
being utilised in sub-Saharan Africa.  It reviews the literature concerning the emergence 
of developmental states in Africa. The conclusion highlights how historic developmental 
states were often the product of trial and error and rather than a grand-plan.  The idea of 
developmental states therefore works less as a model and more as a ‘buzzword’ that has 
its own uses and effects.  
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1. Introduction1 
 
The possibilities of ‘developmental states’ in Africa has become a subject of interest for scholars, 
development practitioners and African leaders alike.  In the 1980s and 1990s structural adjustment 
and good governance interventions were concerned with rolling back the state in Africa; as they were 
seen to be bloated, inefficient, badly governed and corrupt. The discourse is, however, shifting: the 
state is increasingly understood as significant for development. There is also a palpable attempt 
within parts of the continent to seek to emulate the developmental successes of East Asia (Fourie, 
2011). Within this context there has been a growing interest, particularly within Africa, in the possibility 
of African developmental states, and this concept has recently become a popular idea for hastening 
development in Africa.  There has been a flurry of conferences and publications on the prospects for 
developmental states in Africa (Edigheji, 2005; 2010; Meyns and Musamba, 2010). The ANC in South 
Africa have already utilised the concept of a developmental state in their electoral campaign material. 
(Meyns and Musamba, 2010), and the late Ethiopian Prime Minister Meles Zenawi promoted the 
model as the way forward to African finance ministers (New Business Ethiopia, 2011).  
Developmental states have also been called for by the Economic Commission on Africa (Africa Focus, 
2011).  
 
If developmental states in Africa are possible and desirable, what kind of developmental states are 
being promoted?  Here the discussions, statements and plans of proponents in South Africa and the 
late Mele Zenawi's proposals for Ethiopia have probably been the most clearly and widely articulated, 
and, as will be discussed, centre on democratic, mass engagement approaches
2
  These interact with 
ongoing debates about the usefulness of the ‘east Asian model’ being utilised in sub-Saharan Africa 
(Mkandawire 2012; Ohno and Ohno, 2012).  These moves are accompanied by recent research 
which highlights that development outcomes can emerge from certain kinds of patrimonial behaviours 
which are often seen to be a barrier to developmentalism (Booth and Kelsall, 2010).  As well as 
                                                          
1
 This paper draws on a larger review of the literature on developmental states conducted for the Effective States 
and Inclusive Development Research Centre at the University of Manchester (Routey 2012) 
2
 There are of course other examples of states within Africa discussed as developmental states, notably 
Botswana and Mauritius (Taylor 2005; Sandbrook Meisenhelder, 1997).  There are also other states seen to have 
developmental elements Tanzania and Rwanda (Lockwood 2005; Booth and Golooba-Mutebi, 2011) 
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research which highlights how successful developmental policies in East Asia have focused on 
agricultural policies which have reached a large number of people (van Donge, Henley, and Lewis, 
2012).   
 
Moreover this paper moves away from the well trodden set of discussions of whether selected African 
states can be said to resemble a developmental state model or not.  Rather, it contends that 
developmental state concept is significant for how it is shaping debates about governance and 
development in Africa within countries and within development circles.  This is, illustrated by the use 
of the term as a political agenda within Ethiopia and South Africa and the picking up and extension of 
the ideas of developmentalism and the role of the state and Africa learning from East Asian examples 
undertaken by recent development research programmes; Africa Power and Politics (APP) and 
Tracking Development.
3
  The point of departure is that the idea of a developmental state is a political 
idea, as much as it is an academic model. Here perhaps I unintentionally imply too neat a division 
between academic concepts and political ideas which is clearly erroneous; political theory and 
political events always dissolve into each other.  Although it should be acknowledged in this context 
the academic provenance of the term is perhaps part of its appeal as the concept is seen to not come 
encumbered by ideological 'baggage'.  And whilst it can carry a negative association with 
authoritarianism this, as will be discussed, is often ameliorated by the proposal of a democratic 
developmental state.  It can thus be seen to be refreshing in terms of its abandonment of value laden 
policy prescriptions, undertaking instead to learn from comparative history and the analysis of the 
empirical data (Fritz ans Menocal 2007: 531). Learning from the 'success stories' of East Asia seems 
sensible and pragmatic -although what exactly those lessons are is a matter of some debate (cf. 
Routley 2012).   
 
This article reviews recent discussion of the developmental state in academic circles but also as 
political rhetoric, and policy.  The realms of the academic and the politician are not so removed from 
each other in these debates with the late Ethiopian Prime minister’s contribution to these debates 
consisting in part of a chapter published in an academic book (Zenawi 2012).  The following sections 
explore some key aspects of the promotion and contestation of the idea of the 'developmetnal state' 
across the realms of the academic and the politician, drawing particularly on the debates in Ethiopia 
and South Africa.  Firstly,to set the scene I review debates around the definition of the term 
'developmental stae' and the broader question of whether the emergence of developmental states in 
Africa is possible.  
 
2. How to identify a developmental state?  
                                                          
3
 More information on both these programmes can be found on their websites - African Power and Politics 
www.institutions-africa.org and Tracking Development www.trackingdevelopment.net .  Perhaps un-surprisingly 
given their crossover of interests and influences researchers from both programmes have just started some new 
research on developmental regimes http://www.institutions-africa.org/page/initiating-developmental-regimes  
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The meaning of the term ‘developmental state’ is both disputed and evolving (Evans 2010a; 2010b).  
Even the constituent elements of the term are not unproblematic: for instance, ‘the state’ as a term is 
highly contested (Abrams, 1988: 59).  State-society relations play an important role in the narrative of 
developmental states, their success often being seen to rest on a very particular form of state-society 
relations that Evans terms embedded autonomy (1995).  Evans term describes a double move of the 
state bureaucracy not being adversely influenced by interest groups but remaining connected enough 
to society in order to act to ensure growth and (to an extent) redistribution (Evans 1995; 1998). The 
state within these accounts does not always remain a unified cohesive entity: instead, many scholars 
examine the relationship not only of developmental states to their societies but also how different 
parts of the developmental state, such as the executive and the bureaucracy, interact with each other 
(Johnson, 1982; Ramseyer and Rosenbluth, 1993; Haggard, 2004).    
 
Scholars started to define and elaborate the concept of a developmental state in response to their 
explorations of the economic growth stories of countries in East Asia, and this particular experience 
has tended to dominate the framing of the concept (Johnson, 1982; 1987; Evans, 1995), although 
there were a number of previous examples of economic growth in which the state has been seen to 
be the key actor (List, 1904; cf. White and Wade, 1988: 1; Leftwich, 2000: 155).  Johnson argues that 
the concept of the developmental state also exists as an abstract generalisation (Johnson, 1999: 43).  
This abstraction is usually synthesised from specific East Asian cases to form a model, an ideal type 
of developmental state. This approach has been criticised by some scholars as overtly homogenising 
the diverse experiences of East Asian states (Haggard, 2004: 56; Putzel, 2002; Ohno and Ohno 
2012). Given the diversity of experiences it is perhaps not surprising that scholars of developmental 
sates differ on their precise composition of the attributes associated with developmental states and 
what conditions allow developmental states to emerge.
4
  However, there is a general agreement that 
there are two aspects to a developmental state, which Vu terms developmental structures, and 
developmental roles (Vu, 2007: 28) and have been termed elsewhere terms as structure and ideology 
(Zenawi, 2012:167) and can be discussed more generally, as state capacity and commitment.  Vu’s 
highlights how both of these elements can exist separately from each other, whilst they are still 
needed in combination for a developmental state to be successful (Vu 2007).   
 
Whilst this understanding of developmental states as combining two attributes of capacity for and 
commitment to development is useful, it has pitfalls due to its close association of the form of the state 
with its successful outcomes.  This makes it difficult to identify developmental states prior to their 
attainment of successful growth (Fritz and Menocal, 2007: 534).  Moreover, this can seem to render 
the term tautological “…since evidence that the state is developmental is often drawn deductively 
                                                          
4 For a much fuller review of this literature please see Routley 2012.  
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from the performance of the economy” (Mkandawire, 2001: 290). Mkandawire argues therefore, that 
for the term to really mean anything there has to be the possibility for the state to be developmental 
but not achieve economic growth due to unforeseen external shocks (Mkandawire, 2001).  In other 
words, there has to be the possibility for there to be failed developmental states, which requires 
defining the developmental states not by their successes but by their commitment to a widely held 
ambition - a hegemonic ideology - of development (Woo-Cummings, 1999).  This definition is useful 
as it allows for failure, makes the definition of developmental states less tautological. Moreover it 
emphasises the significance of this driving communal goal – often associated with nationalism (Woo-
Cummings 1999, Johnson 1999) - to the developmental state.  It highlights the hegemonic project or 
consensus around development that marks out a state as developmental, in contrast to a state which 
achieves or attempts to achieve growth or other developmental outcomes through acting as a 
different kind of state (e.g. regulatory).. 
 
If a developmental state is one which (successfully?) produces or pursues developmental outcomes – 
what is a developmental outcome?  Whilst what outcomes are considered developmental is clearly 
highly contestable, it has, surprisingly, been the subject of relatively little debate until comparatively 
recently and developmental states have been mainly associated with economic growth (Mkandawire, 
2001).  This growth has often seen to be the result of 'upgrading' the economic basis of the national 
economy to undertake economic activities higher up the global value chain, resulting with 
considerable emphasis on industrialisation as a key element of the developmental state story (Doner, 
Ritchie, and Slater 2005; Evans 1995: 7-8).  This  growth was, however, seen in addition to have 
social benefits and the concept of a developmental state is often used to denote not only states which 
have achieved significant growth rates but rather growth rates alongside wide spread legitimacy and 
elements of redistribution(Leftwich, 2000: 166-167).  Scholars have also highlighted that there has 
generally been significant increases in the standard of living for a large proportions of the population 
of developmental states (Johnson, 1987: 143; Leftwich, 2008: 16).  The legitimacy of developmental 
states in East Asia rested on these significant improvements in standards of living for a broad cross 
section of society (Wade, 1990:.7; Fritz and Menocal 2007: 534; Lin and Monga 2011: 278).  So, the 
central elements of the developmental outcomes for much of the developmental states literature was 
growth, with widespread increases in the standard of living (through increased employment and 
industrialisation in the case of East Asia and Mauritius) and broad based legitimacy.  The emphasis 
placed on these various aspects varies between scholars, and scholars often focus on different 
outcomes – growth, living standards, legitimacy - as being central to defining a developmental state.  
Similarly the precise combination of attributes or capacities that a state needs to be developmental 
are highly debateable, however for the purpose of this paper a working set of attributes can be 
summarised as:  
 A capable, autonomous (but embedded) bureaucracy (Evans, 1995). 
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 A political leadership oriented towards development (Musamba, 2010; Fritz and Menocal 
2007).  
 A close, often mutually beneficial symbiotic relationship between some state agencies (often 
discussed as pilot agencies) and key capitalists. (Johnson, 1982; 1987).   
 Successful policy interventions which promote growth (Wade, 1990; Beeson, 2004). 
 
 
 
3. The (im)possibility of developmental states in Africa? 
 
“To some, talk about ‘developmental states’ in Africa, let alone of ‘democratic 
developmental states,’ may seem no more than a pipe dream. Have we not been told 
that our neopatrimonial institutions, our ethnic diversity, our geographical location and 
globalisation, all make ‘developmental states’ simply unimaginable in Africa?” 
(Mkandawire, 2010: 74) 
 
In debates around the transfer of the East Asian developmental state model to other regions, it is the 
transfer of this model to Africa which has generated the most debate within the literature.  Some have 
espoused what Musamba entitles the ‘impossibility theorem’: that African states will not be able to 
become developmental (Musamba, 2010: 30-31).  There are three key substantial strands to the 
arguments made about the difficulties of transferring the developmental state model to the African 
context: Firstly, the changed geo-political situation (compared to when East Asian states became 
developmental), especially increased globalisation; Secondly, the generally problematic nature of the 
transfer of institutions; Lastly, the absence of state capacity and developmental commitment in Africa 
– due in part to the persistence of neopatrimonial tendencies (Musamba 2010: 30-33; Mkandawire 
2010: 74).  This paper will concentrate on this last set of arguments (although the other two sets are 
touched upon) concerning the difficulty of developmental states emerging in Africa due to the 
perceived characteristics of the African state.  
 
The changed global context is, however, significant: there are general debates about the reduced 
overall possibilities for new developmental states to emerge in the East Asian mode given the 
changed global economic and political environment.  One of the key changes is globalisation and 
global economic liberalisation which is seen to constrain developing states developmental space in 
terms of the policy options available to developing countries to protect their emerging industries; many 
of which were utilised by the East Asian developmental states (Wade, 2003: 622; Beeson, 2004: 32; 
Hayashi, 2010: 60; Chang 2006).  In addition, the east Asian states’ significant strategic geopolitical 
position meant that the US (subsequently a key driver behind the pressure to liberalise and open up 
national markets in order to level the playing field), were well disposed towards these states and in 
fact opened up their markets to them. (Chang, 2006: 18; Pempel, 1999: 155; Hayashi, 2010: 46). In 
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addition, newly emerging developmental states face considerably slowed growth in global markets, 
making it harder if not impossible for states to achieve growth using the same strategies that the East 
Asian states utilised (Wade, 1990: 347-8; Hayashi, 2010: .59). There are also connected changes in 
the labour market globally which affect the strategies which will be necessary for emerging 
developmental states (Evans 2010b).  This in turn requires a developmental state which looks quite 
different to its East Asian precursors.   
 
Mkandawire has highlighted the disjuncture between two sets of literature on this subject.  The first 
analyses the nature of the African state and, from this basis, refutes the possibility of the replication of 
East Asian successes in Africa. (Mkandawire, 2001: 289, 294). Indeed, much of the literature 
understands African states as neopatrimonial, weak, predatory or kleptocratic. (Jackson and Rosberg 
1982; Diamond 2008; Bayart, Ellis and Hibou 1999). The other is prescriptive and presupposes that 
African developmental states could exist, detailing what types of policies, structures and relationships 
would make this possible (Mkandawire, 2001: 289).  This results in the ironic situation where;  
 “States whose capacity to pursue any national project is denied at one level (theoretical 
or diagnostic) are exhorted, at the prescriptive level, to assume roles that are, ex 
definicione, [by definition] beyond their capacity, character or political will.” (Mkandawire, 
2001: 289) 
This tension is significant and I suggest it reflects broader tensions in the literature between analytic 
and prescriptive approaches towards development within Africa. Mkandawire highlights how states 
have been examined in comparison to idealised models of states from elsewhere, in this case 
idealised models of the developmental state (2001: 290).  As such, there can tend to be an over 
emphasis on the ‘ought’, on what states should be rather than what they are.  
 
The strand of literature which argues against the possibility of developmental states emerging in 
Africa sometimes commits the temporal error of saying that developmental states cannot emerge as 
they are not currently emerging.  It mutates current circumstances to intrinsic intransient attributes, 
this essentialising move is often short-sighted, the East Asian miracle itself occurred despite some 
early twentieth century evaluations of Japanese workers as lazy and unproductive (Ohno and Ohno 
2012: 224).  .  More specifically dismissals of the potential for developmental states due to a lack of 
state capacity tend to overlook how this was not necessarily apriori but rather how in the East Asian 
experience capacity building occurred dynamically as part of the developmental process (Ohno and 
Ohno 2012).  This does not detract from the value of examinations of the significant factors that could 
potentially constrain the emergence of developmental states in Africa.  However, my interpretation of 
Mkandawire’s ire is a feeling of Africa as a continent being dismissed, and the diversity of the African 
experience being homogenised in a way which undermines a fuller understanding of the strengths 
and weakness of African states (Mkandawire 2001: 290). After all, Botswana and Mauritius are 
frequently discussed as key examples of developmental states (Meyns 2010; Taylor 2005; 
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Meisenhelder, 1997). There are also a number of states in Africa which have been highlighted as 
showing promise of the appropriate developmental state capacity and commitment including;  
Tanzania, () Ethiopia, Rwanda and South Africa (Lockwood 2005; Vaughan and Gebremichael 2011; 
Kelsall and Booth, 2010; Edigheji 2010).  
 
If developmental states are emerging and/or are being advocated in Africa,what types of 
developmental states are they? The next section examines recent discussions of the forms of 
developmental state that are present, or it is hoped will arise in Africa.  
 
4. African Developmental States 
 
4.1 A Democratic Developmental State: Embeddedness and Autonomy  
 
There is a distinct strand in the recent literature, which envisages that new developmental states 
emerging on the African continent will be democratic both as a likelihood and as normative desire. 
The argument runs that these developmental states are likely to be democratic, in part because the 
majority of states are currently democratic and also because there are considerable external and 
internal pressures for democracy (White, 1998). Democratic developmentalism is also an aspiration 
with many advising that it is this form of state that could bring about the ‘best’ developmental 
outcomes (Edigheji, 2010; Musamba, 2010).   
 
This literature runs counter to the association between developmental states and authoritarianism 
which emerged out of examinations of the East Asian developmental states. A number of factors have 
been proposed to constitute a positive linkage between authoritarianism and the emergence of 
developmental states.  An authoritarian government is seen to be able to take a longer term view 
(Johnson, 1987: 143).  Democracy has been seen as problematic for the emergence of 
developmental states due to the short-termism that electoral politics can breed, as opposed to the 
long view that those pursuing a developmental vision in developmental states are required to take 
(Kelsall and Booth, 2010: 27).  Authoritarian developmental states are able to suppress, or ignore, 
interest group demands, which enables their necessary bureaucratic autonomy (Wade, 1990: 375; Vu, 
2007: .30)., Authoritarian states are not, however, necessarily developmental (White, 1998: 7; Fritz 
and Menocal, 
5
2007: 536; Vu, 2007: 49), and there have been of course democratic developmental 
states, e.g. Japan and Botswana.).  Authoritarianism is seen to allow states to be autonomous from 
the pressures of society however, for Peter Evans, this autonomy is just one side of the coin and 
these states could not be effective if completely isolated from society and they were therefore both 
autonomous from broader society but also embedded with it in specific ways - a dynamic he famously 
                                                          
5
 Japan as a developmental state was a formally democratic, but Johnson discusses it as a case of 'soft 
authoritarianism (Johnson ,1982) 
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describes as embedded autonomy (1995).  In the Korean context for example it was within a fairly 
narrow group of bureaucrats and industrialists with whom the dense links of embeddedness were 
formed (Evans 1995).  East Asian developmental states therefore are often seen to have rested on a 
narrow, but vital, coalition between the state and capitalists (Evans 1995, Vu 2007).  In the Ethiopian 
case it is the relationship between these small holder famers and the developmental bureaucracy 
which has been seen as the most significant, both by the regime and by observers. Democratic 
Developmentalism relies to an extent on its coupling wiht the other plank of the Ethiopian approach 
Agricultural Development Led Industrialisation (ADLI).  This is due to the support base of smallholder 
farmers (which account for 80% of the Ethiopian population) which the ruling party draws on (Ohno 
2009: 6). Democratic contexts , however, may (afterall) necessitate a broader based coalition as in 
Botswana (Poteete, 2009)..  Evans also examines case studies of broader based coalitions in India 
and Austria and suggests that, 
“…a broadly defined embeddedness may offer a more robust basis for transformation in 
the long run.  This suggestive evidence argues for further exploration of potential 
variations of embedded autonomy” (Evans, 1995: 17).  
Thus, for Evans, broader incorporation of social groups such as labour and other civil society interests 
under a democracy may in fact be both possible and desirable in newly emergent developmental 
states. He has therefore recently argued that the 21
st
 century developmental state will in contrast to its 
20
th
 century version need to build close ties and be embedded in a broad cross section of society 
(Evans 2010a; 2010b).   
 
This, focus on a broader coalition, is because he sees the 21
st
 century developmental state as 
centrally being a capability enhancing state, looking to promote the capabilities of their citizenry 
through provision of collective goods such as, health and education (Evans, 2010a; 2010b).  He does 
not see this as a complete departure from the developmental state model of the East Asian states and 
highlights the high levels of investment in education (Evans, 2010a: 5; Evans, 2010b: 47).  However, 
the focus on the development of capabilities means that the ‘knowledge’ required by the state cannot 
be obtained only by building the close ties that Evans and others have documented between business 
leaders and the bureaucracy in the East Asian case (Evans, 1995; Moon and Prassad 1994).  Instead 
there will be an acute need for “information on collective priorities at the community level” (Evans, 
2010b: 49).  This requires that policies are not created by technocrats: rather, Evans argues, they 
“must be derived from democratically organised public deliberation” (Evans, 2010b: 43). This 
incorporation would, however, require considerable infrastructural ability to create and sustain broad 
based developmental pacts/coalitions (Mkandawire, 2010:72). The challenges of maintaining this 
broader coalition are likely however to be considerable.   
 
This capability enhancing state with a focus on building of the capacities of 'the people', and the 
inclusion of them in political processes, resonates closely with the developmental state  envisaged in 
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the ANC's  Adopted Strategy and Tactics which outlines its vision of the developmental state as part 
of the National Democratic Revolution (ANC, 2007: point 59.) For the ANC in the South African 
context whilst the developmental state is seen as desirable, democracy - and this concept comes with 
its own historical connotations of racial struggle - is seen to be paramount.  This is starkly reflected in 
the ANC Adopted Strategy and Tactics in which not only is considerably more reference made to 
democracy but democracy appears on the first line whereas the developmental state does not receive 
mention until about a quarter of the way into the text (ANC, 2007).  This is significant as the question 
raised for South Africa is 'Can a democratic state also be a developmental state?' whereas much of 
the literature examining democratic developmental states frames it as 'Can a developmental state be 
democratic?'.  As much as this may seem to be semantics, there are significant differences in 
approach which emerge from this reframing which mean that what is being looked at is the 
possibilities of developmental traits being incorporated in to a democratic context which poses 
different challenges to the introduction of democracy to a developmental state.  
 
A sharp distinction between an authoritarian and a democratic state is perhaps too simplistic in many 
senses, as Johnson's analysis of Japan as 'soft authoritarianism' despite its formally democratic 
status shows (Johnson 1982).  A number of African states which are discussed as democratic and 
developmental have electoral systems which are de facto (if not de jure) dominated by one party.  The 
Ethiopia Peoples' Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) has held power in Ethiopia for over 20 
years and Botswana and Rwanda are similarly formally multiparty systems which are dominated by a 
single party (it should be noted also that the ANC has also held power in South African since 1994).  
One exception here is Mauritius which has a competitive multiparty system.  This does not mean that 
democracy is seen as peripheral for and within these states, although critics of all of these regimes 
would dispute their truly democratic credentials. The Ethiopian government under Zenawi promoted a 
strategy of Democratic Developmentalism, which whilst, as the name suggests, stressed the 
importance of democracy it also pursued a single developmental party remaining in power for a long 
period (Ohno 2009: 4).  This longevity of one party in power is seen as positive as it acts to counter 
the short-termism that more competitive forms of electoral politics may encourage.  The vision of 
Democratic Developmentalism is also that the perpetuation of this long duration of rule is due to the 
legitimacy gained through both "economic performance and democratic procedure" (Ibid: 4).  However, 
for Zenawi whilst democracy was significant for legitimacy, citing the work of Evans and others he 
contended in his own writing that there was a the need for a developmental state to  be autonomous 
from society and therefore a developmental state could only be "semi-democratic, semi-
parliamentarian at best." (Zenawi 2012: 167).  The tension between the concepts of democracy and 
developmental states, the balance between autonomy and embeddedness is then often also about 
the nature of the coalition of embeddednes, how broad based or narrow it is.  While a developmental 
state is required to be responsive, who it responds to is often seen to be to narrow set of actors and 
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interests, rather than the breadth and plurality that democracy implies.  Maybe Zenawi’s half way of 
‘semi-democracy’ is one answer to the balance embeddedness and autonomy.  
 
 
4.2 A Developmental Patrimonial State 
 
The intimacy of the narrow form of embeddness in the case of east Asian developmental states 
meant that they could be seen to be at risk of clientelist capture by the business interests: “[South] 
Korea pushed the limit to which embeddedness could be concentrated in a few ties without 
degenerating into particularist predation” (Evans 1995, p.53).  In a number of the South East Asian 
states this ‘over embeddedness’ was discussed as crony capitalism (Putzel, 2002). 
   
One of the key departures of APPs work on developmental patrimonialism is challenging of the 
assumption that clientelist behaviours and neo-patrimonial regimes automatically undermine 
bureaucracies (Booth, 2010: 15,17; c.f.Williams et al. 2011: 340).  Developmental Patrimonialism is 
the term coined by David Booth and Tim Kelsall, to describe patrimonial state systems that have 
developmental impacts due to the leadership centralised control of rents and adoption of a long term 
view (Kelsall and Booth 2010).  Ethiopia is seen exhibit these elements (Vaughan and Gebremichael 
2011) - South Africa has not been examined by scholars utilising this concept.   The departure point 
for APP’s explorations of patrimonial developmentalism is that different kinds of patrimonial and 
clientelist behaviours have different types of impacts (Booth, 2010: 7).  Their body of work includes 
detailed case studies of African patrimonial states identified as developmental, such as Rwanda and 
Malawi (Booth and Golooba-Mutebi, 2011; Cammack and Kelsall, 2010) and some states that are not, 
such as Zimbabwe (Dawson and Kelsall, 2011).  In a key paper Booth and Kelsall hypothesised a link 
between centralised rent processes, where leaders were able to take a long – horizon view of 
economic growth, in an attempt to identify what types of patrimonial behaviour could be seen as 
developmental (Kelsall and Booth, 2010).  They examine five African countries (Côte d’Ivoire, Malawi, 
Kenya, Rwanda and Tanzania) during periods they identify as being characterised by long-horizon 
centralised rent processes.  The paper then examines the economic and political landscape of these 
periods to probe any connections between long-horizon centralised rent processes and economic 
growth, concluding that there is a relationship, but that these processes are not sufficient on their own 
(Kelsall and Booth, 2010). A skilled leader and a competent bureaucracy are seen as significant 
elements required, alongside long-horizon centralised rent processes to achieve economic growth. 
 
In this respect, factors associated with the mainstream developmental states model can be found in 
the examples, of ‘developmental patrimonialism’ discussed by the APP programme. In particular the 
importance of the civil service, especially in terms of its professionalism and its capacity, emerges 
from some of their work: for example, Kenya’s autonomous bureaucracy (Kelsall and Booth, 2010: 19) 
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and the professionalism of bureaucracy during the first period of Banda’s rule in Malawi (Cammack 
and Kelsall, 2011).  Cammack and Kelsall’s description of the civil service in the Malawian case 
reflects many of the qualities ascribed to the bureaucracy in developmental states inasmuch as 
bureaucrats were highly educated and drawn from prestigious institutions, with a clear career path, 
and promotion based on merit. (Cammack and Kelsall, 2011: 90).    
 
Kelsall and Booth do not claim these instances as simply fitting the developmental state model: rather, 
they suggest that developmental patrimonialism describes is a different way in which a more 
developmentally focussed state may come about with the attendant gains of economic growth and to 
an extent social improvements. Evans argues that; “Only when embeddedness and autonomy are 
joined together can a state be called developmental.” (Evans 1995).  Perhaps the developmental 
patrimonial state tips the balance towards a certain kinds of embeddedness, but nonetheless retains 
these two elements.  After all, one of the key elements that emerges out of APPs working papers is 
the importance of a well respected, in some senses effective, professional and disciplined 
bureaucracy alongside patrimonial elements (Booth, 2010; Kelsall and Booth, 2010: 19).  In this way, 
perhaps, patrimonial developmental states could be seen to be another way of pursuing 
developmental goals.   
 
However, there are problematic elements of patrimonial developmental which rest on the 
personalised nature of the developmental rule in many of the examples of developmental patrimonial 
states.  The developmental outcomes are often lost at the point of leadership change or in the case of 
the leader’s waning capacities (Cammack and Kelsall, 2011).  The problematic nature of 
developmentalism resting on a particular leader is also highlighted by the recent death of Zenawi.  
Closing point in Vaughan and Gebremichael's paper on Ethiopia published almost exactly a year 
before Zenawi died highlights that succession crises have the potential to result in the shift from 
developmental patrimonialism to "less economically productive forms" of governance  and that the 
ability of the Ethiopian rulers had not yet been challenged in this regard (Vaughan and Gebremichael 
2011: 61).  The succession to the post of Prime Minister of Hailemariam Desalegn who was seen as 
close to Zenawi and his subsequent pledges to continue with the same policies may mark a 
successful change of leader - but it is too soon to gauge the broader effects of this leadership change 
(BBC, 2012).  The impacts when they emerge may however tell use much about Zenawi's rule and 
the form of governance that took place under it. As Vu outlines; 
“Politicians can consolidate their personal power base differently… For example, if 
politicians seek to build a professional network of loyal clients in the bureaucracy, this 
network helps them but not the state they run.  Instead, if they consolidate their power 
base by building effective coercive state apparatuses, these may stay with the state long 
after they have left the scene.” (Vu, 2007: 36) 
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This highlights one of the key difficulties with developmental patrimonial states is in sustaining the 
gains made and the absence of institution building.  The types of state capacities which patrimonial 
developmental leaders build may not have much longevity beyond particular leaders.  They are 
successful in conducting developmental roles for a time but that they do not build the developmental 
structures or institutions required for these practices to obtain some sustainability (Kelsall and Booth 
2010: 27).   
 
 
4.3 A Pro-Poor Rural Developmental State 
 
In a number of recent publications on developmental states, rural and agricultural development has 
been understood as a keystone.  In addition, it is argued that this is a constituency which African 
leaders have generally neglected (Mkandawire, 2011: 72).  Research by the Tracking Development 
project examines pairs of countries from East Asia and sub-Saharan Africa,
6
 and whilst this is highly 
relevant to the developmental state debates, their work does not engage with the developmental state 
model per se.  Rather, they seek to examine the divergence between development trajectories of 
countries in the East Asian region and sub-Saharan Africa.  Recent publications from this programme 
by van Donge, Henley, and Lewis makes a convincing case for the significance of agricultural reform 
prior to states emerging as industrialising developmental states (2012).  They argue that in South 
East Asia;  
“Agricultural and rural policies raised rural incomes and levels of well-being, leading 
directly to mass poverty reduction, and indirectly to the creation of a conducive climate 
for industrial development” (van Donge, Henley, and Lewis 2012: 12).  
These were not instituted in sub-Saharan Africa where countries spend relatively little on pro-poor, 
pro-rural policies and, therefore, it can be seen as both the root of South East Asia’s successes and 
Sub-Saharan Africa’s failures.  One of the elements which they suggest may have been significant in 
South East Asia undertaking pro-poor rural policies, in contrast to the experience in sub-Saharan 
Africa, is the perception of a more imminent threat of rural rebellion in East Asia (van Donge, Henley, 
and Lewis 2012: 19; Henley, undated).  This echoes Doner, Ritchie and Slater’s concern with threats 
of unrest that push elites to follow a developmental course of action (Doner, Ritchie and Slater, 2005).    
 
Land reform is also viewed as a signifcant part of an environment which provided economic freedoms 
to small scale entrepreneurs and peasant farmers, that were vital to the economic successes of South 
Asia (Donge, Henley, and Lewis 2009). In addition, it has been seen as a significant element which 
preceeded to the emergence of the developemental stat -  Korea, Japan and Taiwan all underwent 
                                                          
6
 The pairs that they examine are: Nigeria - Indonesia; Kenya - Malaysia; Tanzania - Viet Nam; and Uganda - 
Cambodia.  More information about this project can be found at http://www.trackingdevelopment.net/  
 
Oct 2012 
 
13 
 
significant land reform (Kuznets, 1988).   Whilst most scholars do not posit that agricultural policies 
and land reform are a sufficient condition for a developmental state to emerge, they are often argued 
to be a necessary precursor to the emergence of a developmental state.  Wade cites Taiwan’s land 
reform as one of the largest non-communist land reforms, and he sees land reform, alongside a 
ceiling on land ownership, as significant, arguing that they limit wealth accumulation in land and 
improve agricultural productivitiy (Wade, 1990: 241)  Not only does he view land reform as 
advantageous, but also proposes that an ongoing cap on land ownership is required to prolong these 
benefits (Wade, 1990: 297).   
 
The absence of disspossession and the undertaking of land reform may also be significiant as they 
are elements of, and evidence of, a weakening or a removal of agricultural elites.  Evans argues that 
India’s state has a relatively Weberian bureaucracy, but that it struggles to be developmental and 
build close relationships with business because of the sizable influence of large landed rural elites 
(Evans, 1995: 67-8). The class relations and the relations of the smaller agricultural producers to the 
state which occurs in the absence of, or due to the political weakness of, these elites may help to 
create developmental outcomes and possibilities.  The existance of agricutlural elites per se does not 
mean that a close relationship with industrialisers and pro-poor rural policies cannot take place.  
Mauritus did not get rid of its large sugar estates and the elites asssociated with them.  However, the 
state was able to enact policies that were not in line with the interests of this elite: these policies were, 
in many senses, pro-poor rural policies.  The epitome of this was the sugar tax which was “applied 
most harshly to the large estates, while small cane growers were assisted and subsidised by the 
state” (Meisenhelder, 1997: 284).  Equitable growth in agriculture can, therefore, be seen as a key 
driver of development in developmentnal states.   
 
This accords with research emphasising how part of the significant impact of these agricultural 
activities was in the number of people that these development strategies reached (Henley, undated) 
and the equity of the growth strategy (Nyanjom and Ong’olo, 2012).  Henley contrasts the broad 
outreach agricultural policies persued in Indonesia and Malaysia with Kenya’s less successful policies 
which were centred on more elitist schemes that favoured ‘progressive farmers’ and disregarded the 
majority (undated: 5).  It is this ability to impact a large number of people, and especially to undertake 
pro-poor policies, which he argues had a broad impact across large numbers – quantity not quality – 
and which make argicultural interventions potentially so productive.   
 
5. Conclusion: The developmental state as buzzword rather than model 
 
As many scholars agree that there is not a East Asian model that can simply be copied, cut and 
pasted over to Africa (Manor, 2008; Ohno and Ohno, 2012; Evans, 2004).  Development policy 
makers with greater social benefits in mind may however, crave clear policy choices and plans that 
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have been proven within in the context of East Asia which can be applied (once tailored to local 
circumstances) in the poor countries which constitute much of Africa.  In the discussions of 
developmental states this comes through in a dual emphasis on the importance of vision and planning 
but also on flexibility and experimentation (For example: Gumede 2009: 10-11)  Yet, whilst the 
academic and policy makers have often focused on the planned nature of the developmental state, it 
may be that the lessons of East Asia are somewhat less planned and programmatic: in fact they may 
highlight the need for action which is not about steady planning but about meeting immediate needs 
(Henley, undated).  
 
Henely's highlighting of the immediate problem solving focus of the East Asian developmental states 
is not as much of a departure from the developmental states literature as it may appear.  From the 
outset of the research into developmental states one of the clearest messages was the absence of a 
neat, universally applicable template and, conversely, the gains to be made from local processes of 
negotiation, trial and error.  Chalmers Johnson was one of the first to lay out the character of what he 
called ‘the Japanese model’ and identify abstract features which other societies could use as a guide 
(1982: 314-5).  Interestingly, the state which he identified could learn from Japan’s experience was 
the United States (Johnson, 1982: 323).  Despite Johnson’s outlining of a Japanese model, he argues 
that;  
“… other nations seeking to emulate Japan’s achievements might be better advised to 
fabricate the institutions of their own developmental states from local materials.” 
(Johnson, 1982: 323) 
Similarly for Evans, it is the ability of East Asia’s developmental states to reinvent rather than copy 
that was vital to their success, and this may constitute the key ‘transferable lesson’ of their experience 
(Evans, 1998).  Adaptation and innovation should, then, be the hallmark of any emerging 
developmental state rather than a dogmatic following of the East Asian model. 
 
The taking up of opportunities in the East Asian cases were not, for the most part pre-planned, and 
there was no clear model or masterplan in mind: rather, there was a focus on problem solving and 
urgent action (Ohno and Ohno 2012; Henley, undated).  The concept of a model implies that there are 
discrete stages through which you can proceed to a pre-determined destination.  It connotes the idea 
of a controlled process in which decisions are made according to a plan which builds towards 
achieving long term goals. In contrast, many of the decisions made (which did ultimately bear longer 
term fruit) were actually concerned with serving immediate needs (Henley, undated: 8).  East Asian 
bureaucrats and leaders urgently deployed what resources and ideas were available (to hand) in 
order to solve problems: to deal with priority issues rather than fulfil plans (Henley, undated).  Ohno 
and Ohno contrast this approach with the idealised models approach taken by of economic advisors 
who regarded implementation as not their problem, and thus concentrate on identifying the ‘solution’ 
without engaging with the specific issues to hand – their advice is thus unconsidered in terms of its 
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feasibility (Ohno and Ohno 2012: 226).  They also make similar critiques of the good governance 
approach for its idealisation of what ‘should’ be (Ibid). In this way they echo Mkandawire’s comments 
about the too frequent disconnect between the analytical and the prescriptive (Mkandawire 2001: 289).  
This concentration on ‘should’ can lead to an over concern with what is lacking in comparison to an 
idealised image of the modern industrial state.  Such an idealisation of modernity has, in fact, been as 
detrimental to African policy-making due to the disconnection between symbolic elements of this 
modernity (be they factories, universities, hypermarkets or laptops) the absence of which has often 
been the focus of African policy, rather than the practical problem solving of immediate issues (van 
Donge, Henley and Lewis 2012: s20).  This idealisation can be seen at work in, for example, the 
decisions to favour ‘modernising’ farmers in Kenya rather than undertaking interventions which 
impacted the mass of farmers (Henley, undated: 6).  ‘Muddling’ through, in terms of dealing with the 
issues immediately of concern in an innovative way that vitally impacts large numbers of people may 
be, in the end, more productive than trying to conform to a model.   
 
There seems to be some consensus that if developmental states emerge in the near future, they will 
look markedly different to the states originally labelled as developmental.  If this is the case  we 
should ask how useful it is to label states as ‘developmental states’ in contexts where these states 
cannot be said to possess many of the attributes originally associated with that category?..   Indeed, 
perhaps tying our debates to the question of what similarities or differences can be perceived from the 
original developmental state model runs the risk of blunting our analytical grasp of different patterns of 
social, political and economic relations, by narrowing our focus to elements which had been important 
elsewhere rather than searching for the most significant dynamics in contemporary African states.  
Indeed, some of the most significant works on the East Asian developmental states were those which 
conducted detailed research and highlighted how the practices of these states could not be explained 
simply in relation to the ‘western model’ and thus required a new way of viewing them(Johnson, 1982; 
Amsden, 1989; Wade 1990; Evans 1995).  
 
The attention being paid to the idea of developmentalism and Africa learning from East Asia is a 
departure from the emphasis on 'best practice' and 'good governance' and it is not co-incidental that 
attention to these ideas emerges alongside a shift in development thinking in some quarters - "From 
best practice to 'best fit' "(Booth 2011: 1).  The interest in the concept in some senses can be seen to 
come from a search for alternative indeed, the taking up of the term by some was part of a rejection of 
previous neo-liberal orthodoxies (Zenawi, 2012) or as an alternative to the free market (Edigheji, 
2006: 5). Interest in the term for the alternative it offers without engagement with the real content of 
what the term describes is a frustration for academics and others who are committed to the value of 
the model (see Edigheji's comments on the lack of elaboration of the concept and concrete 
engagement with what he views as the essential institutional elements of the developmental state in 
South Africa(Ibid: 6)).  Interest in developmental states for African leaders and policy makers can thus 
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be seen in some contexts to arise from conversations with donors and other western actors.  
Alemayehu highlights for example that Zenawi’s writings on the developmental state are in English 
and the paper was first presented in Britain and remained largely un-discussed in Ethiopia (2009: 11).  
On the other hand the discussion of the South African developmental state is often more directly 
aimed at a domestic audience with different political organisations offering their own ‘spin’ (Edigheji 
2006).  In both the discussions of African leaders with allies and internal political debates what 
emerges is a broad based hope and desire for learning from east Asia and the developmental state 
model will offer solid alternatives but a plethora of different interpretations as to what the lessons for 
African leaders might be.   
 
The variety of the lessons that can be drawn from the East Asian experience are perhaps also part of 
their allure.  As Fourie highlights in her examination of Ethiopia and Kenya the experiences that 
African countries look to is influenced by the historical and ideological context of the country (and the 
leaders) searching for lessons (2011).  This can also be observed in Edigheji’s analysis of different 
actors usage of the term in South Africa being driven by their broader vision of the political realm and 
their position within it: So for example the Communist Party sees the most productive implementation 
of the developmental state to involve embeddedness not with capital but with a progressive workers 
movement (Edigheji 2006: 3).  In this sense then the term ‘developmental state’ can be understood as 
a ‘buzzword’ in line with Cornwall and Brock’s exploration of such terms which give a generalised 
sense of direction and legitimisation outside their semantic meaning (2005).  Buzzwords come to be 
important in part because of the broad range of meanings (perhaps even conflicting ones) that they 
connote. Therefore, they come to be signifiers of values rather than technical descriptors.  The 
developmental state as ‘buzzword’ encompasses a range of attributes such as prosperity, wellbeing, 
efficiency and growth.  Despite or maybe because of this conceptual blurring, the uptake of the 
developmental state concept by politicians can be seen as highly positive in terms of the possibilities 
it enables.  The pursuit of a developmental state can thus imply the pursuit of a novel mode for 
achieving development, and this can contribute towards a future oriented rhetoric that, which in turn, 
can be productive of the commitment identified as necessary within the developmental state 
literature.  .  The term developmental state is, then, indefinite and often used in a manner described 
by one journalist as a mantra,  
“As with all such highly general prescriptions, the implementation of this call for 
"developmental states" is both complex and problematic. And reading this report one 
feels that repetition of the "developmental state" mantra is likely overdone, as compared 
with relatively little attention given to the obstacles to the emergence of such states, of 
which the authors are undoubtedly well aware.” (Africa Focus, 2011). 
 
This ephemeral, buzzword, nature of the concept of developmental states is not necessarily negative, 
but it does highlight how the concept of developmental states could become utilised in ways that are 
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unexpected and come to mean different things in different contexts.  This is not an observation 
specific to developmental states.  In addition to Cornwall and Brock’s work on “poverty reduction”, 
“participation” and “empowerment” (2005),  other scholars have discussed divergent understandings 
of Human Rights (Englund, 2006), and democracy (Abrahamsen, 2000).  There is nothing unique 
about the notion of the developmental state which would mean that its utilisation would not be as 
divergent.
7
 This does not mean that discussion of developmental states by African leaders is 
completely disingenuous, there is an understandable desire amongst some in Africa to imitate the 
successes they have observed in East Asia.   
"Policymakers have seen, in their own lifetimes, how countries such as China and 
Singapore were able to "come of age" in a hostile international environment. So why 
shouldn't they, too, be able to turn things around?" (Fourie 2011).  
This is not necessarily to follow the developmental state model per se, many are trying to follow 
China's lead which follows a slightly different pattern to the 'typical' developmental state model (Fourie 
2011).
8
   
 
Whilst, there are multifarious issues surrounding the question of how translatable the experiences of 
East Asian States and indeed China in the latter half of the 20th century are into lessons for countries 
on the African continent in the first half of the 21st - which are acknowledged by African policy makers 
as well as academics (Fourie 2011); the  attempt of a number of African states to follow East Asia's 
lead in their development policy is itself a trend worth studying - whether we think that states inline 
enough with the 'proper' developmental state model is being reproduced or not.  In drawing our 
discussions perennially back to definitions of the model, deviations from an ideal type or indeed the 
creation of new models maybe we miss out on looking at what the idea of the developmental states 
does to debates, policies and politics – whether it is interpreted ‘properly’ or not.    
 
 
  [Word Count 7,991] 
                                                          
7
 Others have already cautioned that the term ‘developmental state’ could become appropriated for ends that 
may not seem developmental to everyone and/or which raise other moral and political concerns (Evans, 2010b: 
51; Pempel, 1999:146).   
8
 Although there is some literature discussing China as a developmental state - see for example Howell 2006 and 
Jian-xing, 2010 
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